

## Malicious Browser Notifications

The New Phishing Attack Not Blocked by Your Current Cyber Defense

### Roger A. Grimes

Data-Driven Security Evangelist rogerg@knowbe4.com



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Data-Driven Defense Evangelist KnowBe4, Inc.

Twitter: @RogerAGrimes
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/rogeragrimes/


### **About Roger**


- 30 years plus in computer security
- Expertise in host and network security, IdM, crypto, PKI, APT, honeypot, cloud security
- Consultant to world's largest companies and militaries for decades
- Previous worked for Foundstone, McAfee, Microsoft
- Written 12 books and over 1,000 magazine articles
- InfoWorld and CSO weekly security columnist 2005 -2019
- Frequently interviewed by magazines (e.g. Newsweek) and radio shows (e.g. NPR's All Things Considered)


#### **Certification exams passed include:**


- CPA
- CISSP
- CISM, CISA
- MCSE: Security, MCP, MVP
- CEH, TISCA, Security+, CHFI
- yada, yada


### Roger's Books





















Malicious







#### **About Us**

- The world's largest integrated Security Awareness Training and Simulated Phishing platform
- Based in Tampa Bay, Florida, founded in 2010
- CEO & employees are ex-antivirus, IT Security pros
- We help tens of thousands of organizations manage the ongoing problem of social engineering
- Winner of numerous industry awards









## Learn

- Notification basics
- How legitimate websites are targeted to deliver these stealthy phishing attacks
- Why browser notification phishing attacks bypass your cyber defenses
- Other sneaky browser attacks the bad guys use to infiltrate your network
- How to shore up your defenses and to protect against them all



### **Before Notification Maliciousness**

For decades, malware writers and phishers have exploited "transitive" trust:

Banner ads

#### Typical scenario#1:

- Legitimate vendor asks trusted marketer for help with web campaign
- 2. Marketer reaches out to trusted web campaign firm for help
- 3. Web campaign firm promises a certain number of views
- 4. Web campaign firm subcontracts with another sometimes dodgy vendor who is really adware group

#### Typical scenario#2:

- 1. Malware/phisher group poses as legitimate company and buys ads
- 2. They create online content for display in ad
- 3. Legitimate content is switched out for malicious content when wanted



### **Before Notification Maliciousness**

For decades, malware writers and phishers have exploited "transitive" trust:

- Malicious banner ad campaigns
  - Very sophisticated
  - One innocent-looking element replaced
  - Ex: https://www.domain.com/counter.html
    - Original URL points to a normal "counter" applet
    - Then counter.html is switched out on the fly with malicious JavaScript
  - Not shown to anyone legitimate involved with ad buy/sell
  - People checking reports of maliciousness don't find anything wrong
  - Fact: Most major websites have no clue about what is executing on their web sites
  - 50% to 90% of all client-side executing code is from third parties
    - Much of it is not good
  - Many companies hiring companies, like The Media Trust, dedicated to quickly detecting maliciousness on legitimate web pages





### **Before Notification Maliciousness**

For decades, malware writers and phishers have exploited "transitive" trust:

- Banner ads
- Rogue applets
- Code snippets
  - "Must retain counter to reuse" or "Must retain source URL to reuse"
- Web site "well poisoning"
- And now hackers/phishers are starting to abuse browser/desktop notifications
- Google says Abusive notification prompts are one of the top user complaints we receive about Chrome.




# Learn

# Notification Basics




- Known as browser/desktop notifications or push notifications
- Allows display messages to be sent to user <u>outside of their browser/tab or app</u> after the notification permission was given by the user





- Each app/website <u>must</u> first ask user permission to send future notifications
  - Default
    - User can be asked to approve; else deny by default
  - Granted
    - User approved, future notifications can be sent
  - Denied
    - User denied, notifications cannot be sent for that app or website





#### **Desktop notifications**

- May be shown on desktop over other apps or a gentle reminder shown
  - Windows 10 shows an empty message dialog box in lower right taskbar when there are no notifications waiting



 Shows a message dialog box along with notification message count when notifications are waiting







#### **Desktop notifications**

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 Shows a message dialog box along with notification message count when notifications are waiting









- Based on a standard to allow developers to send messages to end-user's cross-platform using a single programming method
- Early versions introduced around 2009 (known as JavaScript Desktop Notification API then)
- W3C introduced an updated HTML5 version called the Notification API in 2014 (may be treated/merged with Push Notification API)
- Started to be more abused in 2019
- Browsers and operating systems must support the Notification API
- Supported on Microsoft Edge, Google Chrome, Apple Safari (desktop only),
   Opera, Mozilla Firefox, but not Internet Explorer
  - Desktop and mobile versions may support different feature sets



# It's Even an RFC (Request for Comments)

- RFC 1030 Generic Event Delivery Using HTTP Push
- Created Dec. 2016
- RFCs are essential Internet standards and rules
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8030
- Originally used registered port TCP 1001, but now uses 443 to get past firewall issues




Figure 1: WebPush Architecture



#### **Browser Version First Supported**

- Chrome version 22
- Edge version 14
- Firefox version 22
- Opera version 25
- Safari version 7

\*Not all features supported by all browsers (for example, Safari does not support opening new browser windows)



#### **Notifications Service Workers**

- Each allowed notification process is called a "service worker" in developerspeak
- Service workers can update themselves, changing what they display and do
- Service workers can install other service workers
- Service workers can modify network content from their own pages
  - So what you see may not be what you get
- They don't need your permission after the first allow
- Be careful of giving that initial trust



#### **Service Workers in General**

- "A service worker is a JavaScript file that runs separately from the main browser thread, intercepting network requests, caching or retrieving resources from the cache, and delivering push messages"
  - From <a href="https://developers.google.com/web/ilt/pwa/introduction-to-service-worker">https://developers.google.com/web/ilt/pwa/introduction-to-service-worker</a>

#### Service workers must be:

- Registered
  - They are registered before you get the (first) Allow prompt
- Installed
- Activated




#### **Notifications are Multimedia**

- Can display more than just text
- Icons/Emoticons, badges, etc.
- Pictures, content, URL links




URLs significantly increase potential maliciousness



#### **Notifications have Actions**

- Can create any button label(s) and link it to allowed actions
- Often limited to two actions at a time



Actions may not always be good



#### **Notifications Actions**

Code example

```
self.registration.showNotification('New
message from Vendor', {
  actions: [
    {action: 'like', title: 'Like'},
    {action: 'reply', title: 'Reply'}]
});
```

```
self.addEventListener('notificationclick', function(event) {
 var messageId = event.notification.data;
 event.notification.close();
 if (event.action === 'like') {
  silentlyLikeItem();
 else if (event.action === 'reply') {
  clients.openWindow("/messages?reply=" + messageId);
 else {
  clients.openWindow("/messages?reply=" + messageId);
}, false);
```

#### **Notifications Actions**

Code example

```
self.registration.showNotification('Import
ant alert from Microsoft
Corporation!!!', {
  actions: [
    {action: 'open', title: 'Open'},
    {action: 'open', title: 'Ignore'}]
});
```

```
self.addEventListener('notificationclick', function(event) {
 var messageId = event.notification.data;
 event.notification.close();
else if (event.action === 'open') {
  clients.openWindow(("https://microsoft.com.badurl.com");
 else {
  clients.openWindow("https://microsoft.com.badurl.com");
}, false);
```

#### **Some Possible Notifications Actions**

- Vibrate mobile devices
- Send sounds
- Display alerts
- Use Unicode characters
- Can open/delete/archive email
- Can initiate dialing telephone numbers
- Can require interaction (user can only click "OK")
- Have OnClick, OnClose, OnError events
- Can open new browser windows at predetermined URLs





#### **Comments on Notifications Actions**

From https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2016/01/notification-actions

"The interesting thing is that the actions don't have to open up a new window, they can perform general application interactions without creating a user interface. For example, a user could "Like" or "Delete" a social media post that would perform the action on the user's local data and then synchronize it with the cloud without opening a UI..."



#### **Some Notification API Testing Sites**

- https://web-push-book.gauntface.com/demos/notification-examples/
- https://www.bennish.net/web-notifications.html
- https://tests.peter.sh/notification-generator/#actions=3
- https://www.acme.com/webapis/notification.html



#### Web Sites/Apps/Organizations Use Notifications

- Many legitimate web sites use
- Many legitimate apps use
- Many legitimate organizations buy and sell access to other site's and app's notifications and the customers who allow them



#### **Push Notification Networks**

- Many organizations exist to sell access to other subscribed notifications forming "push networks"
- Sometimes not so legitimate organizations are involved

 Table source: https://trends.builtwith.com/widgets/pushnotifications

Top In Push Notifications Usage Distribution in the Top 1 Million Sites

Technology	Websites	%
OneSignal	18,547	1.85
─ VWO Engage	892	0.09
₹ PushEngage	793	0.08
■iZooto	783	0.08
Subscribers	663	0.07
<sup>™</sup> Webpushr	632	0.06
Truepush	542	0.05
➡ Aimtell	485	0.05
<b>I</b> FoxPush	427	0.04
Gravitec	382	0.04
PushAlert	321	0.03
Push.World	308	0.03
♠ Pushnami	297	0.03
CleverPush	284	0.03
WonderPush	215	0.02
■ PushPushGo	215	0.02
<sup>™</sup> PushWoosh	172	0.02
■ Pushly	118	0.01
■ Batch	98	0.01
O Push7	89	0.01



#### **Push Notification Monetization Networks**



Highest Push Notification payout rates for website owners, small publishers, high volume site owners.





# Learn

# Malicious Notifications



#### **Example**

- Malware group or push network will pose as 100% legitimate vendor asking web site to allow their "affiliate" code to be executed when a user allows notifications
- 2. At first, all seems legit
- 3. Later, network switches out harmless code for malicious code
  - a) When vendor/victim complains, usually malicious network doesn't respond, is slow to respond, or denies it's happening
  - b) When proven that it is happening, then they say something bad accidentally slipped through and/or blame it on some other "rogue" person or company who will be "punished"
  - c) It always seems to take a long time for bad code to be removed
  - d) Rinse and repeat



#### **Headlines**

Home » Cybersecurity » Social Engineering » Browser Push Notifications: Useful Feature Exploited by Deceptive Marketers

Browser Push Notifications: Useful Feature Exploited by Deceptive Marketers



by Tomas Meskauskas on August 23, 2019

Pop-ups and browser lockers have given way to irritating and potentially destructive push notifications



PushBug - Uncovering Widespread Push Notification (RFC 8030) Abuse in the Wild.



17 Be Very Sparing in Allowing Site Notifications







#### **Example Maliciousness/Objectives**

- Phishing
- Install malware
- Track user's activities
- Advertisements
- Redirectors
- Maliciousness can be replaced on the fly as wanted
- Often do multiple bad things at once



#### **Example Maliciousness/Objectives**

Why Notification Phishing Is Especially Dangerous

- Notifications happen outside the app or browser where it was approved
- Can even be displayed on "lock screen"
- Can be used to do credential phishing
- Once initial approval is allowed, the sky is the limit




#### Fake AV Message Example



Example from: https://www.indelible.global/post/pushbug-uncovering-widespread-push-notification-rfc-8030-abuse-in-the-wild




#### Fake AV Message



Example from: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/11/be-very-sparing-in-allowing-site-notifications/



#### Fake AV Message




Example from: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/10/scammers-use-old-browser-trick-to-create-fake-virus-download//



## **Malicious Notifications**

#### **Fake Video Error**




Example from: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/technology/2019/01/browser-push-notifications-feature-asking-abused/



## **Malicious Notifications**

#### Fake Video Error Message




Example from: https://statics.esputnik.com/photos/shares/Blog/images/abusive/image5.png/



## **Malicious Notifications**

### Verify You're Not a Robot Scam



Example from: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/scam-browser-notification-prompts-increased-by-69-percent-in-2019/



## Learn

# Defending Against Malicious Notifications



## Why Malicious Notifications Evade AV

#### **General**

- Relatively new abuse method
- Often coming from legitimately, trusted sites and apps
- Dynamic domain use
- No easy way to review/fix configuration issues
- Victims intentionally "allowed it"!

Note: Some AV vendors are becoming better at recognizing it.



## Phishing Cannot Be Beat by Intelligence


- Anyone can fall victim to social engineering
- "Smart people" are just as likely to fall victim to phishing as anyone else
- Scammers use "stressors" to make people bypass their normal skepticism survival skills
- Whether or not someone clicks on a "phish" or falls victim to a fake notification, has more to due with awareness of digital crime than anything else
- Once people are aware of social engineering, phishing, and all it's forms, the less likely they are to fall victim to it



## **Defending Against Phishing**

## **General Defense Methods**

- Policies
- Technical Controls
  - Anti-Malware Software
  - Anti-Spam/Phishing
  - Content Filtering
- Security Awareness Training



https://blog.knowbe4.com/the-three-pillars-of-the-three-computer-security-pillars



#### **Overview**


- Education
- Review and remove unneeded existing notifications on desktop and browser(s)
- Configure desktop and browsers to reject notifications by default
- Find out if your AV/EDR solution is aware of malicious notification scams
- Run latest browser versions
- Report notification scam domains to Google and Microsoft




#### You Can Disable Them In the Browser

- You can enable or disable them globally in the browser or OS
- How you do that varies per browser and OS

Example: Microsoft Edge








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
Example: Microsoft Edge





#### You Can Disable Them In the Browser

Example: Microsoft Edge






Will globally block if disabled

#### You Can Disable Them In the Browser

Example: Microsoft Edge

Can individually block or allow per site, or if you remove it will allow the site to ask permission again






#### You Can Disable Them In the Browser

Example: Microsoft Edge

These sites have already been denied permission (blocked) and can't ask again





#### You Can Disable Them In the Browser

Example: Microsoft Edge

These sites have already been allowed permission (allow)



Changes often require a tab or browser restart




#### You Can Disable Them In the Browser

**Example: Google Chrome** 

You can configure per site

chrome://settings/content/






#### You Can Disable Them In the Browser

Example: Apple Safari

- You can configure per site
- Safari > Preferences > Websites > Notifications






#### You Can Configure Them In OS

**Example: Microsoft Windows** 

Settings/Notification & actions






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




### You Can Configure Them In OS

**Example: Microsoft Windows** 

Settings/Notification & actions





#### You Can Configure Them In OS

- Example: Apple MacOS
- Apple > System Preferences > Notifications



Source: https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/customize-website-notifications-sfri40734/mac



#### **Example Step by Step Browser Instructions**

- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/technology/2019/01/browserpush-notifications-feature-asking-abused/
- https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/18/18716041/website-notification-promptspop-ups-how-to-stop
- https://hackingvision.com/2019/09/25/malicious-browser-push-notifications/
- https://www.androidpolice.com/2020/06/18/track-block-rogue-ads-android/

Remember to disable in OS and browsers




# Some Browsers Will Warn You If They Recognize Potentially Malicious Notifications

- https://blog.chromium.org/2020/10/reducing-abusive-notification-content.html
- Google proactively subscribes to notification pushes and monitors behavior
- They will warn users if notification request comes from a known rogue domain
- Chrome browser v. 80 (released Feb. 4, 2020) and above have this feature



# Some Browsers Will Warn You If They Recognize It


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- Chrome browser v. 80 (released Feb. 4, 2020) and above have this feature





#### **Report Sites With Malicious Notifications**

- https://safebrowsing.google.com/safebrowsing/report\_phish/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/support/report-unsafe-site-guest





#### Resetting Browser Settings Automation

- 3<sup>rd</sup> party device management programs which allow application/registry setting editing
- Microsoft Edge
  - Requires custom Administrative Template and Group Policy or Microsoft Intunes
  - https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-to-manage-the-new-microsoft-edge-through-group-policy/
- Google Chrome
  - https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/188446?hl=en



#### **Education**

- Share this presentation
- General security awareness training, including specific training on notification phishing

#### Good links to review and share:

- https://www.indelible.global/post/pushbug-uncovering-widespread-pushnotification-rfc-8030-abuse-in-the-wild
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/11/be-very-sparing-in-allowing-sitenotifications/



## **KnowBe4 Security Awareness Training**



#### **Baseline Testing**

We provide baseline testing to assess the Phish-Prone<sup>™</sup> percentage of your users through a free simulated phishing attack.



#### **Train Your Users**

The world's largest library of security awareness training content; including interactive modules, videos, games, posters and newsletters. Automated training campaigns with scheduled reminder emails.



#### **Phish Your Users**

Best-in-class, fully automated simulated phishing attacks, thousands of templates with unlimited usage, and community phishing templates.



#### See the Results

Enterprise-strength reporting, showing stats and graphs for both training and phishing, ready for management. Show the great ROI!






## Generating Industry-Leading Results and ROI

- Reduced Malware Infections
- Reduced Data Loss
- Reduced Potential Cyber-theft
- Increased User Productivity
- Users Have Security Top of Mind

## **87%** Average Improvement

Across all industries and sizes from baseline testing to one year or more of ongoing training and testing

Note: The initial Phish-Prone percentage is calculated on the basis of all users evaluated. These users had not received any training with the KnowBe4 platform prior to the evaluation. Subsequent time periods reflect Phish-Prone percentages for the subset of users who received training with the KnowBe4 platform.



Source: 2020 KnowBe4 Phishing by Industry Benchmarking Report



# Questions?

Roger A. Grimes- Data-Driven Defense Evangelist, KnowBe4

rogerg@knowbe4.com

Twitter: @rogeragrimes

https://www.linkedin.com/in/rogeragrimes/